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Abstract:  Historically, telecommunications services developed adding one network to 
another (voice and data networks), but Next Generation Networks (NGN) are developing 
as native multiservice networks. Main characteristics include: broadband capacity, IP 
protocol, ability to transmit voice, data and video, quality control, separation among 
different network layers. The fact to deliver with one only network different services such 
as voice and data, now treated in a very different way with respect to charging principles 
(interconnection for voice, peering for Internet exchanges), poses the problem of the 
charging model to adopt in the future. In the paper we will analyse pros and cons of the 
different charging principles, both at wholesale and retail level, from an economic 
perspective. The first conclusion is that there is no "magic solution", as any criteria has 
pros and cons, but that it appears more appropriate to leave operators to choose their 
retail models, once the wholesale criteria are settled. Then the paper concentrates on the 
different scenarios which can arise choosing different charging principles at wholesale 
level. Particular attention is given to the issues of quality safeguard and of recovering 
investments in innovative networks and services. On many aspects "intermediate" 
scenarios seem better to answer economic problems than the "pure" scenarios, (calling 
party network pays for all wholesale services, including Internet/data, or bill & keep for 
everything, including voice).  
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istorically telecommunications networks where built one after the 
other, adding data networks to the existing PSTN network. On the 
contrary, the new so-called Next Generation Networks (NGN) are 
developing as native multiservice networks. This category can include very 
different networks, based on different technologies, but their main common 
characteristics include: broadband transmission, with quality control (QoS) 
end-to-end; the ability to support voice, data and video services; the use of 
the IP protocol 1, the separation among different layers 2 and the adoption of 
open and standard interfaces. 
1 At least as a trend. 
2 Transport, service and network control. 
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The reasons to build new, more technologically developed, networks are, 
basically: the ability to supply new valuable services to end users (especially 
services that customers are willing to pay for and which can contrast the 
decrease of fixed voice revenues) and the opportunity to benefit from cost 
savings in the long run (especially real estate costs). 
As every change, also the move towards NGN raises some points of 
attention, with particular reference to the issues of IP interconnection, 
interoperability among networks of different operators and architectural and 
network topology changes. In this paper we will focalise on the issue of how 
to charge interconnection among different networks in an IP environment.  
Before entering into this issue, it can be useful to observe that the current 
regulatory framework is founded on the technology neutrality principle. 
Therefore we don't see general problems in the application of the current 
regulatory framework in the move towards next generation networks, even if, 
obviously, some modifications could be needed in the detailed resolutions 3.
The new framework under discussion 4 is in the same line of thought, even if 
some proposed novelties can have influence on the regulatory powers 
applicable also to NGN issues, with special reference to new National 
Regulatory Authorities and European Commission powers, the creation of a 
new European body of regulation  5, and the possibility to introduce the 
functional separation remedy. 
Entering into our issue, the move towards NGN can pose problems of IP 
interconnection because, at the moment, two very different interconnection 
models are applied to the two main networks: the PSTN network for voice 
services and the Internet network for data services. As a matter of fact, voice 
interconnection is characterised by the payment of a price per minute of 
conversation and by well defined quality standards. On the contrary, the 
exchange on the Internet network is based on peering, which means that 
every undertaking bears entirely the costs necessary to reach a peering 
point and contributes only to the node's operating costs 6. On the quality 
side, then, instead of defined quality standards, the best effort rule applies. 
3 See, for instance, the modifications already included in the most recent Recommendation on 
Relevant Markets. 
4 EC proposal 13 November ‘07. 
5 BERT in the first reading of the European Parliament. 
6 In practice, peering system is a Bill & Keep formula with traffic symmetry clauses. E. GALLO  35 
Obviously, if a new network is built, carrying all type of services, the need to 
choose a common rule arises. 
In order to understand which is the most suitable rule for charging IP 
interconnection on NGNs, we need to enter a little bit into the different 
possible charging principles, both at retail and at wholesale level. 
As for the retail side, we can choose among three different types of 
charging principles:  
x  Calling Party Pays (CPP), in which the calling party bears all the cost 
of the call (or of the message sending). It is the most common rule, currently 
applied for: calls for voice telephony on fixed networks, calls from mobile 
networks, SMS; 
x  Receiving Party Pays (RPP), where the receiving party bears the 
entire cost of the call (or of the message) since the originating point. It is now 
applied for toll free numbers; 
x  Both Party Pays (BPP), in which the cost of the call is shared between 
the caller and the callee. It is currently used for: shared paid calls, calls 
towards a mobile number abroad, mobile calls in the United States, 
Internet 7.
The 3-parties differentiation appears to be the most precise, even if some 
authors prefer to include BPP in a larger definition of RPP, as they basically 
show the same characteristics with regards to economic analysis 8.
Similarly, on the wholesale side we can identify three basic charging 
principles:  
x  Calling Party's Network Pays (CPNP), where the operator supplying 
the caller bears all the costs of transmitting the call (or the message 
sending) to the receiving party. If another network is involved, the same 
operator has to pay also for the transit service. It is the system used for: calls 
for voice telephony on fixed networks, calls from mobile networks, SMS; 
7 Some authors include a 4
th type, the No Party Pay (NPP) charging principle, meaning that no 
customer is explicitely asked to pay for the service, as for the Internet network. The majority of 
authors, nevertheless, prefer not to differentiate this case, pointing on the fact that both the 
sender and the receiver of messages indirectly pay for the connection. 
8 This 2-parties differentiation is adopted also in the ERG (2007) document. 36     No. 72, 4
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x  Receiving Party's Network Pays (RPNP), in which it is the receiving 
network to bear the costs, including transit and collection. This is applied for 
toll free numbers and for the collection of calls in indirect access; 
x  Bill & Keep (B&K), where every network bears its own costs, as no 
payment is due for traffic exchange. This principle is basically applied on the 
Internet network. 
Also on the wholesale side some authors don't distinguish among the 
three different charging principles, preferring to include RPNP in the CPNP 
category, pointing out the fact that in both cases it is the network operator 
which invoices the final customer to pay also on the wholesale side. In this 
perspective, we can distinguish between CPP and RPP (including BPP 
definition) on the retail side, and between CPNP/RPNP and B&K on the 
wholesale side. 
In order to understand which charging principle can be most suitable in 
an NGN environment, we have firstly to analyse the impact of the main 
relevant economic problems on the different criteria. Main problems include: 
externalities and SPAM/SPIT, on the retail side, and termination monopoly 
and hot potato problem, on the wholesale one. 
An externality arises when the consequences for welfare are not fully 
accounted in the price of a good, thus deriving a sub-optimal use of the 
resource. In telecommunications markets we can distinguish between 
network externalities and call externalities.  
Network externalities arise because every new subscriber increases the 
value of the network for existing subscribers, but this value increase is 
generally not included in the price. This problem seems to be better 
addressed with CPP, as the penetration of the service (which means the 
subscription to the network) tend to be maximised when the user can benefit 
from the service without necessarily being called to pay for it (he pays only 
when he decides to communicate with someone, and not when others 
decide to communicate with him). 
Call externalities, on the other hand, derives from the fact that often also 
the callee, and not only the caller, derives a utility from the call. If the cost is 
all charged to the caller (CPP criteria) this externality is not internalised in 
the price. From this perspective, a BPP system, in which both consumers 
pay for the call seems to best address the call externalities problem. But E. GALLO  37 
some authors 9 have argued that things are more complicated than this, as 
the callee can be subject to two types of error:  
-  one type of error, for the callee, is to accept a call from which it would 
gain a zero or negative utility (e.g. advertising calls). This error is not so 
serious, as it can end the call when it realises that if would get no benefit 
from it, thus increasing also the caller utility 10;
-  the other type of error for the callee is to refuse a call from which it 
would have gained a positive utility. This error is more problematic, as the 
refusal reduces the welfare of both consumers. Therefore, if the caller 
utility is sufficiently high, it can be efficient that the caller subsidises the 
callee paying its costs, thus encouraging it to answer. 
In other words, when speaking about call externalities, it has to be 
considered that, not only the callee can derive a utility from the call, but also 
that the caller derives a utility from the callee answering its call, not merely 
from the fact of initiating the call. This means that if the price is set only at 
the call origination cost (as in the BPP system), this externality is not 
necessarily internalised. These considerations bring us to put a question 
mark on whether charging principle, among CPP or RPP/BPP, is better 
equipped to address the call externality problem. 
Another economic problem affecting retail charging principles comes 
from the fact that some received calls or messages can result in a negative 
utility for the callee. It is often the case for messages (SPAM) or calls (SPIT) 
with advertising content. For these communications an RPP charging 
principle would be not equitable, as the user would be asked to pay for 
something disturbing it. In addition, the use of SPAM and SPIT would be 
incentivised, as the initiator would not pay (pure RPP) or pay only a portion 
(BPP) of the incurred costs, thus damaging the consumers' welfare. In this 
case, the consumer reaction would probably be not to answer to non 
identified calls, thus inefficiently reducing the total amount of calls in the 
market. With respect to this problem, therefore, the CPP criterion is much 
better than the RPP/BPP ones. 
With regards to economic problems affecting wholesale charging 
principles, a first typical problem is the termination monopoly. This problem 
is typical of the CPNP charging principle, as the caller has no control on the 
9 See, for instance, the NGNuk (2007) report.
10 Also the call center operator doesn’t gain any utility from keeping the call if it would end in no 
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network where the receiving party is connected, and therefore he has to pay 
whatever tariff is requested by the termination network. As a matter of fact, 
this circumstance gives a special monopoly power to the termination 
network, even in markets characterised by strong competition. The usual 
remedy to this problem, at least under the European legislation, is to fix the 
termination tariff by means of regulation, also for small, non SMP operators. 
But obviously this solution has positive transaction costs. On the contrary, 
the Bill & Keep charging principle doesn't show the problem of termination 
monopoly, as no charge is due for terminating calls. Obviously the costs to 
terminate a call continue to exist, and the operators should have to cover 
them with the price of calls charged to end user. 
The other important economic problem on the wholesale side is the "hot 
potato" one. Unlike the termination monopoly one, this problem is typical of 
the B&K charging principle as, not having to pay termination costs, the 
originating operator has the incentive to release the call in a point as close 
as possible to the caller, in order to minimize its own network costs. This 
behaviour, then, maximises the costs of the termination network, which will 
have to charge them to its own customers. This circumstance shows two 
problems: firstly, customers have to pay  11 for calls that they have not 
requested and, secondly, if competition or demand characteristic don't allow 
to charge entirely these costs to final customers, this would result in the 
under-investment in the termination network. 
To minimise this problem a typical remedy could be to require operators 
included in a B&K system to interconnect at a minimum number of points 
(PoI), thus reducing the transit on the terminating network. But this would 
imply to determine the topology of interconnection points, and sometimes 
brings to inefficiently duplicate some infrastructures. In any case this is a 
heavy solution, with positive transaction costs especially if determined by the 
regulator. On the other hand the CPNP system doesn't show this problem, 
as the originating operator has the incentive to minimise the termination 
costs, and therefore it has the convenience to use the termination network 
the minimum possible. 
In conclusion, the positive (+) and negative (-) economic aspects of the 
different charging principles are synthesed in the following table. 
11 At least partially. E. GALLO  39 
Retail side  Wholsale side 
CPP RPP-BPP  CPNP-RPNP  B&K 
Call Externalities  - / +  + / -     
Network Externalities  +  -     
Consumers habit  +  -     
SPAM and SPIT  +  --     
Termination monopoly      -  + 
Hot potato      +  - 
From this table it emerges a general superiority of the CPP criteria at 
retail level, especially considering also the aspect of the consumers habit, 
which is obviously very important as it affects the size of the total 
demand 12. On the contrary we observe a balance of positive and negative 
aspects at the wholesale level. 
Before making some considerations on how to choose the most suitable 
charging principle it can be important to make some considerations on the 
relationship between retail and wholesale criteria. As a matter of fact, 
traditionally it has been said that a strict relationship between retail and 
wholesale criteria exists: 
CPP <->  CPNP 
RPP <->  RPNP 
BPP <->  B&K 
But, despite this typical belief, in literature strong relationships don't 
emerge, as different authors 13 have shown basically the following: 
-  B&K favours smaller or zero tariff per minute, higher installation costs 
and higher monthly charges; 
-  CPNP tends to preclude flat or semi-flat tariffs, but allows smaller 
monthly charges; 
-  offerings including minutes of traffic have high users' utilization, but 
slow penetration; 
-  in presence of a CPNP/CPP framework, we found less per capita use 
of the mobile service, but a quicker penetration. 
In addition, we observe that many counterexamples exist on the market. 
Among others, we can cite the following: 
12 This superiority is shown also by other studies, analysing the main princples for tariff setting, 
with particular reference to benefits distribution, according to the principle that costs must be 
covered by beneficiaries, especially if externalities exist. See, for example, NGNuk, 2007. 
13 See, for example, MARCUS, 2006. 40     No. 72, 4
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-  in Italy, flat and semi-flat offers have existed since June 2000 14, also 
in presence of CPNP on the wholesale side; 
-  the huge penetration of mobile telephony has stimulated the usage 
and semi-flat tariffs are now diffusing; 
-  also in a CPP system a monthly charge exists (for the access to the 
network) which, de facto, is paid also to have the possibility to receive 
calls (sort of BPP). 
These considerations bring us to say that the relationship between retail 
and wholesale principles is less stringent than it appears at first sight. This 
means that, even if we have found some advantages in the CPP principle at 
retail level, we will not be compelled to adopt a CPNP one at wholesale 
level, but we have to carefully analyse pros and cons of the different 
solutions.  
In practice, we advocate that, in principle, if an efficient model for 
wholesale charging is chosen, there is no need to impose rules at retail level 
(except, perhaps, some limits for Universal Service purposes). The main 
reason of this conclusion comes from the fact, that a wholesale rule is 
necessary in order to make the different networks communicate, but network 
operators of different sizes can have different incentives in choosing one 
system or the other. Therefore a regulatory "eye" on the choice is needed in 
order to facilitate or impose the agreement. On the contrary, the choice of 
the retail system can probably be left to operators, which have a common 
interest in maximising the consumer demand and use. Obviously regulation 
can always intervene in case of consumers' damage, but this is not likely to 
result from the mere choice of the retail charging principle. 
In the following part of the paper we will concentrate, then, only on the 
choice of the wholesale charging principle in the move towards an NGN, 
analysing firstly the "pure" scenarios (CPNP 15 and B&K) and then a number 
of intermediate solutions, trying to minimise some economic problems of the 
"pure" ones. 
As we have said before, building an NGN means to progressively migrate 
services, already vehiculated with different technologies and charging 
models, on an only IP-based network. This means to choose the wholesale 
14 “Teleconomy” offer. 
15 In its broad definition, including also RPNP. E. GALLO  41 
charging model which will prevail when such a migration will be completed, 
thus opening the way to different possible scenarios. 
The first of the "pure" scenarios is represented by the choice to make 
interconnection paid also on IP networks. In practice, this would mean to pay 
– at least at wholesale level – also for data exchanged on the Internet 
network. 
"Pure" scenarios – Pay interconnection also with IP networks 
pros cons 
- simplicity on the retail side (CPP very 
accepted)
- maintain the equilibrium of traditional 
interconnection
- normally, the subject with the highest 
benefit is the one who pays 
- no problems with Spit and Spam 
- guarantee to recover the investments 
in new networks 
- need to choose the measure unit for payment – not 
trivial problem, minutes of use are no more an 
appropriate measure unit (with data transmission it 
would mean to pay more for worse quality). (*) 
- regulation should continue to deal with the problem 
of termination monopoly 
- it implies to eliminate the current peering system, i.e. 
to impose a payment for what has been exchanged for 
free till now: difficult to accept without a quality 
improvement expressly required 
(*) If the bandwidth is low, it takes more time to deliver a data package. Therefore, if a “per 
minute” price is set, a communication would cost more if the bandwidth is low, e.g. if the quality 
is scarce. 
This solution tends to be quite favourable to the incumbent, which 
continues to maintain its lead in interconnection revenues, while it is less 
favourable for alternative operators, especially for the smaller ones. 
Trying to make an evaluation, we found little acceptable to impose a 
payment on what has always been exchanged for free (Internet), with the 
risk of arbitrages and possible delays in the complete migration towards the 
new networks, thus increasing the overall costs of the system. In addition we 
have to consider that NRAs want to simplify the market and that there is a 
trend towards a general decrease of termination tariffs. 
In conclusion, we think that this solution is not likely to prevail, even if 
some elements of this solution can be kept in the "intermediate" scenarios. 
The other "pure" scenario, on the contrary, forsees the application of a 
pure B&K model, with every operator bearing its own network costs, also for 
voice services (and data, video, etc.). 42     No. 72, 4
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"Pure" scenarios – pure B&K 
pros cons 
- simplicity on the wholesale side 
- in its "pure" version it eliminates almost 
completely the need for economic regulation of 
interconnection (it eliminates the termination 
monopoly) 
- "natural" solution, given the trend towards the 
decrease of termination tariffs through time 
- well accepted by Authorities and new entrant 
operators (but much more by ISPs and small 
operators) 
- eliminates the problem to determine the 
measure unit 
- the ability to recover the investments in new 
networks is subject only to the possibility to 
charge end users for them 
- the "hot potato" problem is maximised 
(relevant for most capillary operators)  
- necessary to think carefully about the retail 
charging criteria to use: the most natural 
criteria (*) is BPP/RPP, which poses relevant 
problems for users 
- in presence of a pure B&K system, it can be 
natural to apply it also to mobile 
interconnection, with a very strong impact on 
revenues
- breaks the equilibrium of traditional interconnection but: 
. avoids litigation on economics 
. solves the problem of asymmetric termination (current opportunity for larger new entrant 
operators) 
(*) Even if not the only possibility. 
This scenario has very strong positive outcomes, but the "hot potato" 
problems can be very serious, at the point to put a disincentive on the 
realisation of large Next Generation Networks. 
In addition, we observe that it is generally not favourable for incumbents 
but, at the meantime, it can be not favourable also for competitive larger 
network operators, especially when asymmetric termination is applied. 
Therefore, probably intermediate solutions offer best perspectives for all 
types of operators, except the smaller ones, which will generally prefer a 
pure B&K solution. 
After having given a look at pros and cons of the "pure" solutions, we 
have then tried to understand if it is possible to find intermediate scenarios 
minimising the negative outcomes of both. A first, immediate, intermediate 
scenario is represented by the possibility to adopt different systems for 
different network typologies/services.  
Intermediate scenarios – different systems for different network typologies 
pros cons 
- it is the solution currently applied: 
paid interconnection on the PSTN 
network and B&K system (peering) 
on the Internet network 
- therefore it is the simplest solution 
to implement 
- but it is a short run solution if the new network will 
substitute completely the previous ones (*)  
- even in the short run, problems arise in presence of 
services which can be provided on both networks (e.g. 
VoIP service), thus opening arbitrage opportunities 
(*) In practice, the parallel application of the two systems could be maintained for a longer time, 
by applying interconnection tariffs only at universal service. E. GALLO  43 
In the short run, during the migration phase, this system can be 
convenient for the sake of simplicity, but certainly it cannot be promoted at 
regime when the network will become an only one. 
The version of this scenario by which different services (e.g. voice and 
data) are treated differently also when transmitted on the same network is 
also quite complicated, as it implies being able to recognise the nature of the 
data packages transmitted on the unique IP network. In practice, this would 
really be possible only if different quality requisites are asked for different 
services (e.g. specific quality parameters for voice and video services, best 
effort for data) 16, but this case is included in the third intermediate scenario 
that we will examine soon. 
The second intermediate scenarios we have considered, foresees the 
application of a B&K system with symmetry clauses. In practice, it is the 
scenario, de facto, applied in peering contracts even if we have to consider 
that two types of asymmetry can arise: 
-  traffic asymmetry, that arises when the operator A has to terminate 
much more traffic coming from the operator B than the traffic that it 
delivers to it; 
-  asymmetry of geographic presence, that arises when one operator is 
much more spread on the territory, thus having to bear much more costs 
to terminate calls coming from other operators.  
Asymmetry is a problem as it puts a disincentive to invest in network 
update, therefore it can be opportune to correct the problem with ad hoc 
clauses. Typically the two types of asymmetries are corrected with one or 
more of the following clauses included in the basic B&K contract:  
-  symmetric traffic is exchanged for free, while exceeding traffic must be 
paied;
-  a minimum number of Points of Interconnection (PoI) is necessary in 
order to be included in the B&K system, otherwise a price is due for traffic 
exchange. 
Intermediate scenarios – B&K with symmetry clauses  
pros cons 
- the "hot potato" problem is 
minimised
- necessary to fix the price (value and measure unit) 
- for the 2
nd type of asymmetry, problem to determine the 
correct number of PoIs to which applying the B&K criteria 
(heavy regulatory intervention)  
16 If the distinction is made only conventionally opportunistic behaviours are likely to emerge. 44     No. 72, 4
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This scenario is quite practical, but maintains some serious negative 
outcomes of the "pure" B&K system. Looking at practical implications, we 
could argue that the traffic asymmetry problem is less relevant and can be 
skipped 17, in order to avoid the problem of choosing the measure unit to 
apply at the excess traffic exchanged. But it can be important to 'sterilise' the 
geographic problem in order to maintain investment incentives (the "hot 
potato" problem penalises the operators investing more), even if this implies 
a regulatory intervention. In conclusion, this scenario can easily be applied, 
as it is already applied for peering, but it is not easy to determine the "right" 
number of PoIs, which, on one hand, has to maintain the incentive to invest 
in the new network but, on the other hand, doesn't have to require to 
inefficiently duplicate networks (thus putting at risk competition and creating 
an unnecessary disturbance to citizens lives 18).
The last intermediate scenario we have considered is represented by the 
chance to apply B&K for best effort and premium tariffs for better quality 
levels. This means that, until a certain quality level (typically best effort) a 
B&K system is applied, while for higher required quality levels a price is due 
for traffic exchange. In practice, it is necessary to define a number of Class 
of Service (CoS), grouping different levels of quality, in order to apply the 
different prices 19.
Intermediate scenarios – B&K for best effort and premium tariffs for better quality 
pros cons 
- in general: it minimises the problems of "pure" solutions 
- in particular: it stimulates the incentive to invest in network 
quality (with pure B&K, risk of alignement to best effort
quality)
- very acceptable scenario from the point of view of both 
equity and current regulation 
- compatible with every charging principle applied at retail 
level (it is a mix of B&K, for minimum quality, and CPNP, for 
higher classes of service) 
- it doesn't eliminate automatically the need for regulation, 
but it minimises its impacts (e.g. the termination monopoly 
remains only for higher quality, therefore it doesn't include 
Universal Service obligations, and it favours agreements 
between operators) 
- making network developments pay, it addresses the 
problem of "net neutrality" (higher parity with economic 
operators of the IT world) 
- it has no specific disadvantages, 
except the one to define 
appropriately the classes of 
service 
- it maintains the disadvantages of 
the "pure" solutions that compose 
this intermediate one, even if 
minimising them 
17 We are speaking only of the exchange of termination traffic. 
18 Think of the need to dig city streets (or even buildings) more than one time. 
19 It is difficult to imagine a continuous quality differentiation.  E. GALLO  45 
This solution appears to solve many more problems than it leaves 
unresolved. In particular, it seems to address in a quite balanced way both 
the problem of network investment incentive and the one to maintain a lively 
competition, as operators can choose their most suitable quality level, with a 
minimum level (the best effort one) which doesn't imply any wholesale 
payment.
The only specific problem remains, then, to appropriately determine the 
number of CoS, which will determine the level of different prices applicable. 
Obviously the problem to choose the measure unit to which the price will be 
applied also remains. 
We have tried to give an example of the methodology which could be 
chosen in order to determine the CoS, making three different hypotheses 
which simplify more and more the number of quality parameters and, in the 
end, the number of prices applied. Obviously this is a theoretical exercise, 
the application of which would require the interaction of operators, looking 
for the most important technical and marketing aspects of the services to be 
supplied. 
Segmentation hypothesis 
Main quality parameters  Hypothesis 1  Hypothesis 2  Hypothesis 3 
 2 Mbps   2 Mbps   2 Mbps 
>2 & 8 Mbps 
>8 & 20 Mbps 
>2 & 20 Mbps  >2 & 20 Mbps 
Bandwidth
>20 Mbps  >20 Mbps  >20 Mbps 
Normal Normal Normal  Priority level 
High High High 
< 30 PoI  < 30 PoI  < 30 PoI 
30 & 70 PoI 
Geographic presence 
> 70 PoI 
30 PoI  30 PoI 
Minimum Minimum -  Interoperability level 
Higher   Higher   - 
In the hypothesis 1, the application of four segmentations for the quality 
parameter of bandwidth, two priority levels, three segmentations for 
geographic presence and two interoperability levels, arrives to identifiy 48 
combinations, to which adding the best effort level to treat under a Bill & 
Keep system. Similarly, the hypothesis 2 shows 24 combinations of quality 
levels, and the hypothesis 3 determines 12 combinations. 
The CoS determined, then, are quite a lot, but it is not necessary to apply 
a different price to every CoS, as it can be argued that services with a 
superior characteristic on one quality parameter and an inferior characteristic 
on another quality parameter are perceived has having the same quality. 46     No. 72, 4
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Therefore, even if theoretically a price could be associated at each 
combination, in practice it can be more convenient to set a price for a group 
of combinations. 
In our exercise we have chosen the following methodology: 
-  the highest relevance of a quality parameter is reflected in the number 
of adopted segmentations, 
-  at every segmentation a score is given corresponding to their quality 
rank (e.g. B4 20=4, P1 21=1…), 
-  at the combinations with the same average score the same tariff level 
is attributed. We have chosen not to normalise the results, in order to 
give more emphasis to the importance of the criteria with more 
segmentations. 
Attribution of tariff levels in the hypothesis 3 
combinations bandwidth  priority  geographic  presence  price 
1 Best effort  B&K
2 B1  P1  G1  P1 
3 B1  P1  G2  P2 
4 B1  P2  G1  P2 
5 B1  P2  G2  P3 
6 B2  P1  G1  P2 
7 B2  P1  G2  P3 
8 B2  P2  G1  P3 
9 B2  P2  G2  P4 
10 B3  P1  G1  P3 
11 B3  P1  G2  P4 
12 B3  P2  G1  P4 
13 B3  P2  G2  P5 
From the table above it appears that, in the 3
rd hypothesis (12 
combinations+best effort) 5 tariff levels were identified. The same exercise 
of attribution of tariff levels in the hypothesis 2 (24 combinations+best effort) 
brought to 6 tariff levels, and in the hypothesis 1 (49 combinations+best 
effort) brought to 8 tariff levels. Obviously more complex ways to determine 
the number of tariff levels starting from the different combinations can be 
adopted. 
In conclusion, this last scenario, applying Bill & Keep for best effort 
quality and premium tariffs for better quality levels, is probably the best 
20 4
th segementation of the bandwidth (B) criteria. 
21 1
st segementation of the priority (P) level criteria. E. GALLO  47 
compromise among the needs of regulatory simplification and an adequate 
investment incentive.  
This scenario appears reasonable and acceptable at regulatory level, and 
it can meet the interests of all operators, especially those with own 
infrastructures. On one side, many small operators are quite well served with 
a best effort quality level, and then they are able to improve their 
interconnection imbalance with the incumbent with the migration to a B&K 
system. On the other hand, the larger operators (incumbent and competing 
ones), which pay more attention to the quality issues, can see their higher 
quality recognised in the prices determined for the highest CoS. 
In addition, this scenario leaves large flexibility margins at retail level, in 
order to be able to apply, for every service, the best tariff package, which 
generally will be the one that makes the main beneficiary pay the larger part 
of the service.  
In comparison with the scenario differentiating the charging criteria 
among vehiculated services (B&K for data, paid interconnection for voice), it 
is more practical, as it differentiates among well defined parameters, and not 
on the basis of services which can be provided to the final user with very 
different quality levels (think about the actual supply of voice service on the 
PSTN network and on the Internet network). 
Obviously infrastructured operators  22 of different sizes can have 
different views on the relative importance of quality criteria but, as the 
underlying idea can be shared by all of them, probably an open discussion 
among different operators, in the presence of the regulator, can bring a more 
practical and less controversial solution for the market. 
22 Pure Service Provider will always prefer a pure Bill & Keep system. 48     No. 72, 4
th Q. 2008 
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